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To develop further insight into antecedents of the CEO’s psychological orientation toward the firm,
we investigate what might lead CEOs to identify with their firms. Although research suggests that
CEO organizational identification can be quite consequential for the firm, little research attention
has been paid to its determinants. To predict how the special context of the CEO position might
lead to identification, we consider a set of motives that members have for identifying with their
organizations and consider how unique features of the CEO position might be relevant to those
motives. Our theory and supportive findings help explain how the context of the CEO position,
including variables often conceptualized as control mechanisms in agency theory research, can
have important effects on subsequent CEO organizational identification. Copyright © 2014 John
Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
There is a growing recognition in the strategy
literature of the value in understanding various
aspects of executives’ psychological states given
their potential consequences for the firm (Carpen-
ter, Geletkanycz, and Sanders, 2004; Finkelstein,
Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009; Ployhart, 2012).
Evidence suggests that the chief executive officer’s
(CEO’s) organizational identification, meaning
the degree to which the CEO’s own identity
and his/her perceptions of the organization’s
identity are tied together or overlap, is a key
psychological state to understand because it may
have important strategic effects. Theory and
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empirical evidence point to ways in which CEO
organizational identification influences the CEO’s
leadership approach as well as his/her stewardship
orientation toward the firm (e.g., Boivie et al.,
2011; Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997;
Peterson, Galvin, and Lange, 2012). Yet, in spite
of the large and developing literature on orga-
nizational identification, the exploration of this
construct at the top of the organization is relatively
new and underdeveloped. Notably, there is little in
the literature to address the antecedents of CEO
organizational identification.
Indeed, to date, antecedents of executive psycho-
logical states have received relatively little research
attention, although that inquiry is highly relevant
to a better understanding of the microfoundations
of strategy (cf. Hodgkinson and Healey, 2011;
Ployhart, 2012). Ployhart (2012) describes the liter-
ature on the microfoundations of strategic manage-
ment in terms of connecting and integrating micro
and macro scholarship. In this study we contribute
to that literature by exploring how constructs that
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prior research has shown to characterize the CEO
position or to be especially associated with the
actions of the CEO may affect the CEO’s level of
organizational identification. In so doing, we pro-
vide the first study to look at how a variety of
firm-level factors affect the development of CEO
organizational identification. The job of the CEO
is qualitatively different from that of lower-level
employees in important ways. The CEO is the pri-
mary target for causal attributions of firm image
and performance. Further, by virtue of the high
level of power and privileges inherent in the posi-
tion, the CEO is the central focus of the financial
and structural controls—rooted in agency theory
ideology—that firms employ to attempt to con-
strain CEO self-serving behavior and to align CEO
interests with those of the firm. We argue in this
paper how each of these characteristics is relevant
to the development of CEO organizational identi-
fication. We thereby contribute to the growing lit-
erature from the upper echelons perspective on the
psychology of corporate leaders (e.g., Boivie et al.,
2011; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; Gupta and
Govindarajan, 1984; Hayward andHambrick, 1997;
Hayward, Rindova, and Pollock, 2004; Miller and
Droge, 1986; Miller, Kets de Vries, and Toulouse,
1982; Nadkarni and Herrmann, 2010; Wally and
Baum, 1994). Whereas most research has examined
the consequences of CEOs’ psychological traits, in
this study we examine antecedents of an important
dimension of the CEO’s psychological orientation
toward the firm.
Notably, our theory and supportive findings about
determinants of CEO organizational identification
also contribute to the corporate governance lit-
erature. Prior research has linked such corporate
governance mechanisms as board independence,
CEO ownership, institutional ownership, and the
firm-performance contingency of CEO compen-
sation to strategic behaviors and organizational
outcomes (e.g., Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1988;
Dalton et al., 2007; Yermack, 2006). By theoriz-
ing how these governance mechanisms may have
significant effects on subsequent CEO organiza-
tional identification, we illuminate the role that
governance mechanisms can have in shaping the
psychological orientation of the CEO toward the
firm.
We argue and show how certain types of gover-
nance mechanisms, namely those that entail vested
interest and incentive alignment, may have the
indirect effect of enhancing organizational identifi-
cation. We further argue and show how other types
of governance mechanisms, those that entail struc-
tural limitations on the CEO’s ability to exercise
autonomous control, may have the side effect of
diminishing organizational identification. All of
these types of controls are rooted in agency the-
ory thinking, and are intended to align the CEO’s
interests and behavior with the firm’s interests. Prior
research has argued and demonstrated that CEO
organizational identification may reduce agency
costs (Boivie et al., 2011; Davis et al., 1997). If, as
we will argue here, a governance mechanism like
firm-performance contingent CEO paywill enhance
CEO organizational identification, then an indirect
effect of that governance mechanism may be to
enhance CEO stewardship behavior and therefore
to reduce agency costs. But if, as we will argue
here, a governance mechanism like board inde-
pendence has a negative influence on CEO orga-
nizational identification, then a side effect of that
governance mechanism may be a weakened effect
on control over CEO self-serving behavior. The
importance of our inquiry therefore is to suggest
how these different corporate governance mech-
anisms can have differential and even opposing
effects on an important dimension of the CEO’s psy-
chological orientation toward the firm.
BACKGROUND
Why CEO organizational identification matters
A key idea from the literature pertaining to out-
comes of organizational identification is that
members who identify more strongly with the
organization are less likely to prioritize or even
distinguish between their own self-interests and the
interests of the organization (Dukerich, Golden, and
Shortell, 2002; Dutton, Dukerich, and Harquail,
1994). The strategic leadership literature would
suggest that such an orientation toward the firm
when held by a CEOmay have significant effects on
firm outcomes (Davis et al., 1997; Finkelstein et al.,
2009). In the context of the CEO’s high levels of
perceived and actual influence over firm outcomes,
a CEOwho identifies strongly with the organization
may be apt to act as a good steward of the firm’s
interests, tantamount to them being his/her own
interests (Boivie et al., 2011; Davis et al., 1997).
In support of these ideas, Boivie et al. (2011)
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found evidence that organizational identification
was predictive of reduced self-serving outcomes
with respect to both compensation and perquisites
among the CEOs they studied. CEOs who identified
more with the firm were less likely to draw high
compensation and make extensive personal use of
corporate aircraft when firm performance was poor.
Even as CEO organizational identification may
have those positive implications for the firm, it
is important to recognize its possible “dark side”
(Dukerich, Kramer, and McLean Parks, 1998;
Umphress and Bingham, 2011). Very high levels
of CEO organizational identification can have
nonbeneficial consequences for the firm and its
stakeholders when the CEO begins to view certain
pro-organizational behaviors as correct and appro-
priate even if in a broader moral sense they are
not. So, even though research generally supports
the idea that CEO organizational identification will
lead to stewardship type behaviors, we must allow
for the fact that, depending upon how narrowly an
executive perceives the scope and time horizons
of the firm’s interests, their pursuit could come
at the expense of harming various stakeholders
and even threatening the long term survival of the
firm. Our presumption in the current study as we
examine and test its antecedents is that increased
CEO organizational identification is beneficial, but
this is not necessarily the only outcome, and our
study of antecedents is relevant to its development
regardless of its outcomes.
How the current study of CEO organizational
identification relates to existing research
on antecedents of organizational identification
Very little theory or research has considered the
determinants of organizational identification in the
upper echelons of the organization (cf. Johnson
et al., 2006; Kreiner and Ashforth, 2004; Peterson
et al., 2012). We begin our study by reviewing the
literature pertaining to antecedents of member orga-
nizational identification in general. We organize
our review according to the six motives that Vig-
noles et al. (2006) identified as the most important
motives that people have for moving “toward cer-
tain identity states and away from others” (p. 309),
i.e., to maintain or enhance feelings of self-esteem,
distinctiveness, belonging, efficacy, meaning, and
continuity. We then make connections between that
literature and the special context of the CEO. In
doing so, we identify key features of the CEO posi-
tion that both distinguish the CEO from other roles
in the organization and that are highly relevant to
motives for organizational identification.
The self-esteem motive
The fundamental human drive to maintain or
enhance self-esteem plays a role in many different
theoretical perspectives (for reviews see Leary,
2007; Sedikides and Gregg, 2003; Vignoles et al.,
2006), and notably is central to social identity
theory (see reviews by Edwards, 2005; Haslam and
Ellemers, 2005). An organization that is viewed
favorably by its members provides the members
with a ready source of positive feedback about
themselves and a source of positive social compar-
ison, to the extent that their own identities overlap
with the organization’s identity (Hogg and Terry,
2000; Pratt, 1998). Theory and supportive empirical
findings have therefore suggested that higher levels
of member organizational identification will follow
when members see their organizations as presti-
gious, having an attractive identity, and/or having a
positive external image (Ashforth and Mael, 1989;
Bergami and Bagozzi, 2000; Dukerich et al., 2002;
Dutton et al., 1994; George and Chattopadhyay,
2005; Mael and Ashforth, 1992; Pratt, 1998).
The belonging and distinctiveness motives
People derive and confirm information about how
they are similar to and different from others based
on their identification with social groups (Brewer,
1991). Two contrasting motivations are at play here;
namely, that people are driven to assimilate and
affiliate with others at the same time that they have
a strong desire to distinguish themselves from oth-
ers (Brewer, 1991; Turner et al., 1994). Social group
identification results from both of these motives as
people seek a sense of belonging within in-groups
even as they seek a sense of distinctiveness by per-
ceiving how their in-group is differentiated from
out-groups (Brewer, 1991). The latter drive, artic-
ulated in uniqueness theory (Snyder and Fromkin,
1980), that humans will tend to strive for indi-
viduation, or the “establishment and maintenance
of a sense of differentiation from others” (Brewer,
1991; Vignoles et al., 2006: 310), is argued to
be fundamental to a meaningful sense of identity
(Vignoles et al., 2006). Accordingly, theory and
supportive empirical findings have suggested that
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organizational characteristics that make the mem-
ber’s organization distinctive, that make other orga-
nizations salient as out-groups, and/or that make the
organization’s identity clear will lead to organiza-
tional identification, because they help the member
to define who he/she is, as well as who he/she is
not (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Bartel, 2001; Dut-
ton et al., 1994; George and Chattopadhyay, 2005;
Mael and Ashforth, 1992; Pratt, 1998).
Contrasting with the need for individuation, but
also important to social identification, is the human
drive for belonging, assimilation, or affiliation;
for a sense of “validation and similarity to oth-
ers” (Brewer, 1991: 477; Vignoles et al., 2006).
Theory and supportive empirical findings have
therefore suggested that member organizational
identification will follow from the member’s per-
ceptions that he/she is fairly homogeneous with the
organization’s other members and/or that his/her
self is well described by the organization’s identity
(Bartel, 2001; Dutton et al., 1994; George and Chat-
topadhyay, 2005; Hogg and Terry, 2000; Mael and
Ashforth, 1992; Pratt, 1998).
The efficacy motive
The drive for efficacy, referring to the need to main-
tain and enhance feelings that one is competent
and in control (Breakwell, 1993) is an important
identity-relevant motivation (Vignoles et al., 2006).
Self-determination theorists and identity process
theorists have argued that the need to feel compe-
tence and control is fundamental to human nature,
and that people will strive for identities that con-
tribute to feelings of efficacy (Breakwell, 1993;
Deci and Ryan, 2000; Vignoles et al., 2006). Group
membership is argued and has been shown to be
a positive influence on relevant personal outcomes
including efficacy, competence, control, and power
(e.g., Breakwell, 1993; Riketta, 2008; Vignoles
et al., 2006). Efficacy has been argued to be a
strong driver of why people move toward certain
identity states (Breakwell, 1993; Deci and Ryan,
2000; Vignoles et al., 2006) including why mem-
bers move toward identification with their organi-
zations (Riketta, 2008).
The meaning and continuity motives
A sense of meaning in life—of purpose or
significance—is argued to be central to psycholog-
ical wellbeing, and its pursuit is another motive for
why members may identify with their organizations
(Vignoles et al., 2006). Social identification can
enhance one’s sense of meaning by helping to
curb subjective uncertainty about one’s “place in
the social world” (Hogg and Terry, 2000: 124),
about what outcomes in life are desirable and
about the appropriate means to achieve those
outcomes (Hogg, 2000; Hogg and Terry, 2000).
When affiliation with an organization helps to give
a member that sense of meaning, identification may
be strengthened. In addition, the need for a sense
of continuity—of relative stability in personal
identity “across time and situation” (Breakwell,
1986: 24)—is another motive underlying the
tendency of individuals toward social identification
(Breakwell, 1986; Vignoles et al., 2006). Social
group identification, including identification with
organizations, helps the individual to maintain
a relatively consistent self-conception and helps
the individual to construct a coherent “life story”
(Vignoles et al., 2006: 310). People are drawn
to identify with organizations that provide that
sense of continuity by confirming their own
self-conception; that provide the individual with
feedback that is self-verifying (Swann, Rentfrow,
and Guinn, 2002; Vignoles et al., 2006).
Organizational identification and the special
context of the CEO position
The CEO position by definition and design is dif-
ferent from other roles in the organization in ways
that are directly relevant to the six motives for orga-
nizational identification that we describe above. An
important way in which the CEO position is unique
is that the image and performance of the firm are
attributed far more—by an order of magnitude—to
the decisions and actions of the CEO than to the
actions and decisions of any other individual orga-
nizational members (Hayward et al., 2004; Meindl,
Ehrlich, and Dukerich, 1985; Wade et al., 2006b).
Although the organizational identification of any
member may be influenced by the overall perfor-
mance and image of the firm, we argue below that,
by nature of the CEO role, the CEO will be espe-
cially aware of and focused on the overall per-
formance and image of the firm, and that those
organizational characteristics will be key drivers of
CEO organizational identification. Simply stated,
our overall model draws on the self-esteem and dis-
tinctiveness motives in describing how CEO orga-
nizational identification may be associated with the
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high degree to which the CEO is the target of causal
attributions of firm image and performance.
Further, our model draws on the belonging, effi-
cacy, meaning, and continuity motives in describing
howCEOorganizational identificationmay be asso-
ciated with the tendency for the CEO position to
be subject to the financial and structural controls
designed to constrain CEO self-serving behavior
and to align CEO interests with those of the firm. An
effect of those governance mechanisms and struc-
tures is that, relative to any other organizational
member, the CEO is much more likely to have a sig-
nificant financial interest in the overall performance
of the firm, both in terms of wealth invested in the
firm and the degree to which the CEO’s compen-
sation is tied to overall firm performance (Carpen-
ter and Sanders, 2002; Fredrickson, Davis-Blake,
and Sanders, 2010; Wade, O’Reilly, and Pollock,
2006a). Vested financial interest in the firm has not
received a great deal of attention in the literature
as an antecedent of organizational identification (cf.
Johnson et al., 2006), perhaps because having sub-
stantial wealth invested in the firm and dependent on
the overall success of the firm is not a salient feature
of organizational life for most organizational mem-
bers. We argue below that vested financial inter-
est can be a salient feature of organizational life
for CEOs, and that, because of the belonging, effi-
cacy, meaning, and continuity motives, it will be
a key driver of CEO organizational identification.
In addition, more than in any other organizational
role, autonomy in the CEO role is associated with
the overall governance and ownership structure of
the organization (Dalton et al., 2007; Finkelstein
et al., 2009; Ryan and Schneider, 2002). The firm’s
governance and ownership structures are a salient
feature of organizational life for the CEO, and, by
design, affect his/her autonomy. We argue below
that, because of the efficacy and belonging motives,
variance in structural controls that firms employ to
attempt to rein in CEO self-serving behavior will be
a key driver of CEO organizational identification.
A presumption consistent with our theoretical
approach about the relationship between these
features of organizational life and CEO organiza-
tional identification is that firm-level characteristics
in general are likely to have a stronger influence
on the CEO’s identification with the firm than on
lower-level members’ identification. We know
from past research that lower-level employees
can identify with the firm, but the upper range of
that identification is constrained by their subunit
as a competing basis for identification (Ashforth
and Rogers, 2012). Ashforth et al. (2008: 353)
review the considerable amount of literature that
points to the idea that “lower order identities tend
to be more salient and, therefore, more likely to
have a greater impact on cognition, affect, and
behavior” than higher order identities. Lower-level
members are likely to identify with their own
subunits because they are the primary “basis for
task interdependence and interaction,” because
subunits are more localized and less abstract than
the larger organization, as they are “more exclusive,
concrete, and proximal” for the member, because
knowledge of and impact on the identity of the sub-
unit is salient for the member, because the subunit
provides a salient contrast with other work groups
and subunits in a given work day, and because the
modern firm emphasizes subunit identification by
favoring “teamwork, occupational empowerment,
and lateral communication” (Ashforth et al., 2008:
353). CEOs, in contrast to lower-level members, do
not typically have subunit membership competing
with the larger firm as a salient target for their
identification. Our overarching argument then is
that not only are CEOs more attuned to the perfor-
mance and image of the firm, to vested financial
interest and contingent compensation, and to the
governance and ownership structure of the firm
than would be any other organizational member,
but that these organizational features are highly
relevant to the CEO’s identification with the firm as
a whole, whereas lower-level employees are likely
to attend relatively more to characteristics of their
own subunits within the firm.
Below we elaborate on how these features of the
CEO role are relevant to the six motives for identifi-
cation as we develop specific hypotheses about the
development of CEO organizational identification.
DETERMINANTS OF IDENTIFICATION
AT THE TOP OF THE ORGANIZATION
The high degree to which the image
and performance of the firm are attributed
to the CEO
Due to the power inherent in the CEO position,
more than any other organizational member the
CEO has the potential to believe that his/her actions
and decisions are tied to the firm’s overall efficiency
and effectiveness and to the firm’s image (Finkel-
stein et al., 2009; Meindl et al., 1985). Others, both
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inside and outside the firm, are likely to reinforce
that belief. CEO actions tend to be very visible
and extensively scrutinized by the business press,
financial analysts, and other information intermedi-
aries and firm stakeholders (Hayward et al., 2004;
Meindl et al., 1985; Wade et al., 2006b). Insiders
and outsiders often exaggerate credit for the CEO
when things go well for the firm, and ascribe blame
to the CEO when things go poorly (Meindl et al.,
1985). Because press coverage about the firm is
quite influential on stakeholder impressions of the
firm (Deephouse, 2000; Westphal and Deephouse,
2011) as well as their perceptions of the CEO’s
image (Hayward et al., 2004; Wade et al., 2006b;
Westphal and Deephouse, 2011) it is likely that
CEOs care deeply about and monitor changes in
that coverage. Westphal and Deephouse (2011) pro-
vided evidence that CEOs react to new negative
press coverage by constraining the responsible jour-
nalists’ access to firm information, an indication
that CEOs both monitor and are concerned about
the tenor of press coverage. Bednar, Boivie, and
Prince (2013) found that negative media coverage
prompted firms to engage in strategic change.
Due to self-serving bias, CEOs will tend to
over-attribute positive firm outcomes such as
positive press and good financial performance to
themselves (e.g., as an outcome of their strategies),
and over-attribute negative outcomes to external
causes (e.g., difficult industry or macroeconomic
conditions) (Clapham and Schwenk, 1991; Hay-
ward et al., 2004). As a result, positive firm-level
outcomes will increase the tendency for the CEO to
perceive connections between the firm and the self
(e.g., the CEO’s strategy and leadership), whereas
negative firm-level outcomes increase the tendency
for the CEO to perceive connections between the
firm and factors that do not implicate the self (e.g.,
extraneous industry-level factors). In other words,
firm-level outcomes constitute salient feedback for
the CEO that is potentially very relevant to his/her
self-esteem. The more favorable that feedback is,
the more the CEO can gain self-esteem benefits by
reducing his/her perceptions that there is a dissim-
ilarity between his/her own identity and the firm’s
identity. By reducing that perceived dissimilarity
(i.e., by increasing identification with the firm), the
CEO can essentially convert positive press coverage
about the firm and/or positive firm performance into
self-esteem enhancing feedback about him/herself.
At the same time, positive press coverage and
positive firm performance can appeal to the CEO’s
distinctiveness motive by helping to favorably dis-
tinguish the firm in the mind of the CEO from aver-
age or poorly performing firms. The distinguished
firm then serves as a salient and attractive target for
identification for the CEO, who by perceiving that
the organization’s identity and his/her own identify
are tied together thereby distinguishes him/herself.
Hypothesis 1: Positive press about the firm will
lead to more CEO organizational identification.
Hypothesis 2: Positive firm performance will
lead to more CEO organizational identification.
We note here that these two main effect hypothe-
ses were the result of the a priori hypothesizing that
we conducted as we created a construct validity test
for Boivie et al. (2011). In those minimally spec-
ified models, both variables were statistically sig-
nificant. In the current study we test these hypothe-
ses in models that are much more fully specified,
including many new hypothesized predictor vari-
ables, interactions, and control variables.
The potentially high degree to which the CEO
has vested financial interest in the firm
Members at any level of the organization may,
and often do, have financial ownership in the firm,
typically through employee stock ownership or
retirement savings plans, and further may have
potential income tied to the performance of the
firm as a whole, typically through profit-sharing,
restricted stock, performance shares, or related
incentive plans. However, even in a context where
organizational member vested financial interest
is not uncommon, the CEO position is an out-
lier in terms of the potentially higher level of
vested interest and the meaning associated with it.
Relative to other members, the CEO is more likely
to have a larger equity stake in the organization
and to have a compensation plan that includes
a firm-performance-contingent element (Carpenter
and Sanders, 2002; Fredrickson et al., 2010; Wade
et al., 2006a). Consistent with the predominant ide-
ology of agency theory, this kind of CEO vested
financial interest in the firm is often encouraged
or formally structured by the board in an effort to
ensure that the CEO’s financial incentives will be
aligned with the shareholder’s goals (Dalton et al.,
2007).
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Researchers, particularly from a social psycho-
logical perspective, have elaborated on the link
between possessions and self-identity (e.g., Beggan,
1992; Belk, 1988; Dittmar, 1992). Possessions serve
as an extension and expression of self. As the owner
reflects on them and their meaning, they contribute
to the way the owner sees him/herself, thereby
helping to establish, maintain, and reproduce the
owner’s sense of identity (Dittmar, 1992). In what
Thaler (1980: 44) calls the “endowment effect,”
people value more highly what they own than what
they do not own. In what Beggan (1992: 229) calls
the “mere ownership effect,” ownership increases
affect for (or positive evaluation of) objects, and
increases the tendency to see characteristics of the
self in the object. Owner-members of firms extend
their selves into their firms and define themselves
through their ownership (Schneider, 1987; Zell-
weger and Astrachan, 2008). All these effects of
ownership are relevant to the belonging and conti-
nuity motives for the CEO to identify with the firm
he/she owns, as the CEO is likely to perceive own-
ership as reflective of self; a relatively stable indi-
cator of who he/she is and a meaningful indicator
that he/she is part of a collective. Higher levels of
ownership are likely to lead the CEO to perceive an
increased affinity with the firm’s goals, processes,
and structures (Schneider, 1987).
In turn, ownership is relevant to the meaning
motive for the CEO to identify with the firm. With
increased organizational identification, organiza-
tional goals can become personal goals for the CEO,
enhancing purpose and meaning in life (Hogg,
2000; Hogg and Terry, 2000). Financial ownership
can also serve as a source of power and control in the
organization for the CEO, making ownership also
relevant to the efficacy motive for the CEO to iden-
tify with the firm. As CEO financial ownership is
higher, the CEO’s actual power and self-perceptions
of power in the firm are likely to be higher, and
higher organizational identification is likely to fol-
low as the CEO derives a strong personal sense of
control from perceiving that the organization’s iden-
tity and his/her own identify are tied together.
Along with ownership, the other predomi-
nant form of vested financial interest for the
CEO, firm-performance contingent pay, will
also have substantial implications for the CEO’s
organizational identification. The tying of CEO
compensation to firm performance outcomes
is a practice extensively used in large business
organizations as part of the belief that the firm
and its owners benefit if the financial incentives of
top managers and the owners are aligned (Dalton
et al., 2007; Sanders, 2001; Zajac and Westphal,
2002). The argument that performance-contingent
pay is necessary to achieve alignment between
firm and executive interests is so widely held, it
is virtually a taken-for-granted assumption (Zajac
and Westphal, 1995, 2002). Firm-performance
contingent pay gives the CEO an overt stake in firm
outcomes (Eisenhardt, 1989), and in doing so is
consistent with the belonging motive for the CEO
to identify with the firm, because it emphasizes for
the CEO his/her role in the success of the collective
and highlights how the firm and its members are
an extension of self. It is also consistent with the
meaning motive for the CEO to identify with the
firm, as firm-performance contingent pay signifies
to the CEO that his/her future and the future of
the firm are intertwined. The CEO with higher
organizational identification can adopt that struc-
tural intertwining of futures as an enhancement of
his/her personal sense of purpose.
Hypothesis 3: CEO ownership of the firm will
lead to more CEO organizational identification.
Hypothesis 4: Firm-performance contingency of
CEO compensation will lead to more CEO orga-
nizational identification.
The structural controls that firms employ
to attempt to rein in CEO self-serving behavior
Like vested financial interest, CEO control is asso-
ciated with agency theory ideology. Structural limi-
tations on the CEO’s ability to exercise autonomous
control exist in many firms, consistent with the
agency theory assumption that an unrestrained CEO
may behave inways that serve the CEO’s interests at
the expense of the organization and its shareholders
(Dalton et al., 2007; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Ryan
and Schneider, 2002). Board independence from
management is thought to be beneficial because it
increases the vigilance with which outside direc-
tors monitor CEO behavior and because it increases
directors’ willingness to challenge CEO actions that
are viewed as inconsistent with shareholder inter-
ests (Dalton et al., 2007). In general, independent
boards are expected to be less willing to acquiesce
to CEO wishes and desires that may diverge from
organizational interests.
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Similarly, stock ownership by so-called
pressure-resistant institutional investors (e.g.,
public pension funds and mutual funds) has been
found to constrain CEO self-serving behavior
(Brickley et al., 1988; Bushee, 1998; Hartzell
and Starks, 2003). Researchers have found that
pressure-resistant institutional owners can exert
control over managers, for example by blocking
anti-takeover provisions (Brickley et al., 1988);
influencing the level and structure of executive
compensation (David, Kochar, and Levitas, 1998;
Hartzell and Starks, 2003); blocking attempts to
reduce spending on research and development
(Bushee, 1998); and spurring investments in inter-
national expansion (Tihanyi et al., 2003). These
pressure-resistant institutional investors, due to
the size of their shareholdings, have the power to
exert influence and control over the organization
and the CEO (Ryan and Schneider, 2002), and
are seen as having strong incentives to be active
shareholders and to monitor executive behavior
(Sanders and Boivie, 2004). Large shareholders
can influence executive behavior through the
threat of selling large blocks of the firm’s stock,
which would decrease firm value (David et al.,
2010). Pressure-resistant institutional investors can
also exert influence in the organization because
they have the capacity to develop monitoring
routines and technologies (Almazan, Hartzell,
and Starks, 2005). Such monitoring includes the
use of sophisticated financial systems as well as
directly contacting and pressuring directors and
executives (Almazan et al., 2005; Connelly et al.,
2010; Ryan and Schneider, 2002). CEOs, expecting
a high degree of autonomy in their work, should
be especially averse to this kind of direct, regular
monitoring of their behavior.
The limitations on autonomous CEO control over
the firm inherent in board independence and insti-
tutional ownership have implications for the level
of CEO organizational identification. Prior research
provides evidence that one’s control over an object
leads to feelings of ownership and to the sense that
the object is an extension of self (for a review, see
Pierce, Kostova, and Dirks, 2001). When relatively
unrestrained, control over the firm, especially to
the significant degree that the CEO can potentially
affect the organization and its outcomes, will lead
to a sense of psychological ownership of the firm; a
sense that the firm is an extension of and descriptive
of self (Pierce et al., 2001). In other words, when the
CEO has more control over the organization, he/she
will view it more like an owner, regardless of his/her
actual level of ownership. Organizational identifica-
tion is likely to follow, consistent with the efficacy
motive, as the organization will be a means to the
CEO’s sense of competence and control. From the
perspective of a CEO with relatively high control
over the firm, the firm and its members are in the
service of the CEO’s values, desires, priorities, and
overall vision. Additionally, if the CEO has substan-
tial control, he/she can exert more influence over
the goals, structures, and processes of the organiza-
tion to align them with his/her own goals, priorities
and characteristics, increasing the degree to which
the organization contributes to both his/her sense of
efficacy and sense of belonging. In contrast, organi-
zational structural elements that diminish the CEO’s
autonomous control may impede the CEO’s sense
of the firm and its members as an extension of self,
the CEO’s sense of the firm as a means to fulfill-
ment of the need for competence and control, the
CEO’s affinity with the firm’s goals, processes, and
structures, the degree to which the CEO can exert
his/her influence to make the firm self-defining, the
CEO’s sense of the firm as a means to fulfillment of
the need for belonging, and consequently the CEO’s
organizational identification.
Hypothesis 5: Board independence will lead to
less CEO organizational identification.
Hypothesis 6: Institutional ownership of the
firm will lead to less CEO organizational
identification.
The interaction of structural controls
with positive press and with performance
Our earlier arguments about how positive firm
press coverage and favorable firm performance can
enhance CEO organizational identification presume
that the CEO feels control over the firm and its
outcomes. In other words, those arguments follow
the premise that a distinguishing feature of the CEO
position, relative to even other top executives in
the firm, is that the CEO has a higher degree of felt
influence over the firm’s image and performance.
That feeling of influence is reinforced not only
by the high degree to which the CEO actually has
control over the firm and its outcomes, but also
by the considerable extent to which the firm’s
observers pay attention to the CEO’s statements
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and actions and attribute firm outcomes to the CEO
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Hayward et al., 2004;
Meindl et al., 1985; Wade et al., 2006b). High
felt control over the firm, its image, and outcomes
provides a context for the CEO to strongly identify
with the firm when it is doing well, since the CEO
has both opportunity and motive to perceive a
strong connection between the firm’s success and
his/her own agency; i.e., to perceive that the firm’s
successes are literally his/her successes.
Indeed, even as the CEO may share with lower
level members the tendency to identify with the
well-performing firm simply as a way of basking
in reflected glory and thereby increasing feelings
of self-worth (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Cialdini
et al., 1976; Dutton et al., 1994;Mael and Ashforth,
1992), the CEO’s high level of felt control over
the organization provides a potentially important
mechanism linking positive firm outcomes and
organizational identification. Specifically, high
felt control over the organization facilitates the
CEO’s identification with the firm when it is doing
well because high felt control provides the CEO
opportunity to feel genuine responsibility for
and ownership over the organization’s glory. In
turn, those feelings of genuine responsibility and
ownership lead the CEO to perceive him/herself
as defined to some significant degree by the orga-
nization’s identity because the favorability of the
organization’s identity makes it psychologically
desirable and esteem enhancing to do so.
Even though the CEO position lends itself to high
felt control, the structural limitations on the CEO’s
ability to exercise autonomous control that we
described earlier—board independence and institu-
tional ownership—may attenuate that felt control.
An independent board and institutional owners can
reduce the CEO’s actual and perceived control over
the firm and its outcomes by exerting pressure and
scrutiny on the CEO and by playing an active role
in policy formation and decision making (Tihanyi
et al., 2003; Westphal, 1999). The presence of an
independent board and institutional owners can also
represent for the CEO the possibility that those
independent monitors will exercise post-hoc con-
trol, especially by removing the CEO from his/her
position (Mizruchi, 1983). Earlier we argued that
board independence and institutional ownership
will impede the CEO’s organizational identifica-
tion, as they lessen the CEO’s sense of the firm as
an extension of self, and as they lessen the degree to
which the CEO can exert his/her influence to shape
the organization so that it is reflective of self. Here
we argue that variance in the degree to which the
CEO feels control over the organization will not
only have that main effect on subsequent CEO orga-
nizational identification, but also that such variance
combined with variance in the favorability of firm
attributes (as proxied by firm financial performance
and press coverage) will have an interactive effect
on subsequent CEO organizational identification.
Variance in felt control affects the CEO’s oppor-
tunity to identify with the favorable firm, while vari-
ance in the favorability of firm attributes affects the
CEO’s motivation to identify with the firm even if
opportunity for identification is high. Less felt con-
trol by the CEO will detract from the CEO’s sense
of ownership and responsibility for positive press
reports and positive firm performance that other-
wise would have enhanced organizational identifi-
cation. As the CEO’s felt control weakens, his/her
opportunity to identify with the firm diminishes,
even when positive firm press coverage or posi-
tive firm performance provides the CEO motiva-
tion to identify with the firm. Correspondingly,
less favorable press coverage and firm performance
will detract from the psychological desirability and
esteem enhancement that would lead the CEO with
high control to strongly identify with the organi-
zation. When press coverage and firm performance
are diminished in favorability, the CEO’s motiva-
tion to identify with the firm is weakened, even
when the CEO’s high level of control over the
firm provides ample opportunity for identification.
Together, these arguments lead to our final set of
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 7a: Board independence negatively
moderates (dampens) the degree to which posi-
tive press about the firm will lead to more CEO
organizational identification.
Hypothesis 7b: Board independence negatively
moderates (dampens) the degree to which pos-
itive firm performance will lead to more CEO
organizational identification.
Hypothesis 7c: Institutional ownership nega-
tively moderates (dampens) the degree to which
positive press about the firm will lead to more
CEO organizational identification.
Hypothesis 7d: Institutional ownership nega-
tively moderates (dampens) the degree to which
positive firm performance will lead to more CEO
organizational identification.
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METHODS
Sample and data collection
The data for this study were collected as part of an
ongoing stream of research related to the attitudes
of corporate executives (Boivie et al., 2011). We
measured CEO organizational identification with a
survey sent to all CEOs in a sample frame that con-
sisted of Reference USA’s 2000 largest U.S. public
industrial and service firms. To manage the time
and expense in conducting this large survey, we
sent out the initial (time t - 1) surveys in two waves:
half in January 2004 and the other half in January
2005. To measure subsequent organizational identi-
fication, each responding CEO received a follow-up
(time t) survey one year after the initial survey, and
then another follow-up (time t+ 1) survey one year
later. A total of 40 initial respondent CEOs left
their positions and were not available for one or
both of the follow-up surveys, and therefore were
dropped from the sample. In supplementary analy-
ses we used two-stage Heckman sample selection
models to predict the probability that a CEO was
not dropped, and then to control for that probability
when testing the hypotheses (Heckman and Borjas,
1980). In these supplementary analyses, our results
were unchanged from the results we report in this
paper. To collect data for a robustness check on a
measure of friendship ties between the CEO and
outside directors (described below), we sent ques-
tionnaires to all outside directors at firms with a
responding CEO.
To attempt to maximize response rates, we
followed steps described in prior research (e.g,
McDonald and Westphal, 2003), including
pretests and interviews to help modify and refine
the wording of the survey items, layout, and
instructions, an endorsement from a well-known
corporate leader included with the survey, an
invitation to participate that explained how it
is part of an ongoing program of research on
corporate leadership by faculty at prominent
universities, and follow up survey attempts for non-
respondents. After excluding respondents where
needed firm-level archival data (such as unrelated
diversification) was not available, the overall par-
ticipation rate for the CEO survey was 39 percent
(N= 772) for the one-year lag and 38 percent
(N= 753) for the two-year lag. The participa-
tion rate for the survey of outside directors was
41 percent, with at least two outside directors
responding for 87 percent of firms with a partici-
pating CEO. We used both Kolmogorov-Smirnov
two-sample tests and two-stage Heckman sample
selection models to check for and rule out the
possibility of nonrespondent bias (Conover, 1999;
Heckman and Borjas, 1980).
We gathered demographic data on CEOs from
Standard and Poor’s Register, Capital IQ, Dun and
Bradstreet’s Reference Book of Corporate Manage-
ment, Marquis’ Who’s Who, corporate proxy state-
ments, and annual reports. Data on CEO ownership
and compensation came from proxy statements and
the ExecuComp database, and data on institutional
ownership came from Thomson Financial Securi-
ties Data. Data on board characteristics came from
proxy statements and Compact D. Data on firm per-
formance and size came from CRSP, COMPUS-
TAT , and EDGAR Online.
Data for independent and control variables were
collected for year t - 1; data for the dependent vari-
able were collected for year t and year t+ 1. In our
primary analyses independent variables are mea-
sured in year t - 1. As a robustness check, we also ran
separate analyses (not shown) with tenor of press
coverage, firm performance, CEO ownership, com-
pensation contingency, board independence, institu-
tional ownership, unrelated diversification, number
of board appointments, sales, and CEO cash com-
pensation averaged over (1) the prior two years, (2)
the prior three years, and the results were very con-
sistent with the results we are reporting.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable in this study is the level
ofCEO organizational identification. Our measure
of organizational identification was developed and
validated in prior research (Boivie et al., 2011). The
Boivie et al. (2011) measure is adapted from a set
of survey items developed by Mael and Ashforth
(1992) and Bergami and Bagozzi (2000) to measure
organizational identification, a scale that has been
used and validated extensively in prior studies (e.g.,
Dukerich et al., 2002; Johnson et al., 2006). One of
the questions asks respondents to assess the degree
of overlap between their self-definition and that of
the firm as represented pictorially in the survey by a
series of Venn diagram-type circles ranging from far
apart to complete overlap (see Boivie et al., 2011,
for the wording of all the survey items and for an
illustration of the pictorial question).
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Although the measures we used have been val-
idated in prior research, including Boivie et al.’s
(2011) evidence of discriminant validity relative
to the other survey scales in their study, we con-
ducted tests in order to ensure validity for our
sample. A confirmatory factor analysis on the nine
survey items showed consistent evidence for an ade-
quate model fit. Several widely used fit indexes
exceeded 0.90 (e.g., GFI, NFI, and CFI), and the
root mean square residual (RMR) was less than
0.035. Moreover, the overall chi-square was not
statistically significant (Shook, Ketchen, and Hult,
2004). Inter-item reliability was high (coefficient
alpha= 0.87) and the lambdas (standardized valid-
ity coefficients) were highly significant for all nine
items in the organizational identification scale.
To assess the distribution of the CEO organi-
zational identification variable, we conducted the
skewness and kurtosis tests for normality described
by D’Agostino, Belanger, and D’Agostino (1990),
with the adjustment made by Royston (1991) imple-
mented in Stata. The adjusted chi-square for the
joint test of skewness and kurtosis was not statis-
tically significant (𝜒2 = 2.73, p> 0.2557), and the
p-values for skewness and kurtosis taken separately
were 0.1195 and 0.9066, respectively. Thus, we can-
not reject the null hypothesis that our measure of
CEO organizational identification is normally dis-
tributed; the skewness and kurtosis of our measure
are not significantly different from that of a normal
distribution at the five percent significance level.
Independent variables
We measured the tenor of press coverage received
by the firms in our sample using the content anal-
ysis procedure described by Pollock and Rindova
(2003). This technique calculates the coefficient of
imbalance (Deephouse, 2000) using the formula:
Tenor =
(
P2– PN
)
∕V2 if P > N; 0 if P = N,
and
(
PN – N2
)
∕V2 if N > P,
where P is the number of positive articles about a
firm, N is the number of negative articles, and V
is the volume of articles about the firm (including
those that are neutral) (Pollock and Rindova,
2003). This variable can range from negative one
to one. A score of negative one indicates that all
the articles are negative about a firm and score
of one indicates all positive coverage. Articles
about the focal firm were collected from major
news and business publications in the U.S., as
listed in Factiva and LexisNexis (Pollock and
Rindova, 2003). Also included were articles
about the firm from daily newspapers in a city
where the firm is headquartered or has significant
operations. Two coders independently read and
assessed the articles: one was an MBA student at
a leading business school with an undergraduate
degree in finance; the second coder was a master’s
degree student in nursing with no background
in business. Thus, the coders had substantially
different backgrounds, permitting a stronger test of
interrater reliability (Weber, 1990). The intra-class
correlation coefficient was 91 percent, indicating
a high level of reliability. The primary analysis
included articles from the year preceding the mea-
sure of the dependent variable. The results were
robust to the inclusion of articles from the two year
or three year period preceding the dependent
variable.
Wemeasured the level of firm performance using
three indicators of financial performance: return
on assets (ROA) for an accounting-based measure,
and market-to-book value of equity and total stock
returns as market-based measures. Factor analysis
showed that these indicators loaded on a single
construct. Factor scores were obtained using the
Bartlett method but our results were robust to the
regression method. The firm performance variable
was lagged by one year in the primary analysis.
The results were robust to measures of that variable
averaged over the prior two years, or over the prior
three years.
We measured the level of CEO ownership as
the value of common shares owned by a CEO
divided by total common stock. We measured the
performance contingency of CEO compensation
as the total value of long-term incentives granted
to the CEO in the particular year divided by total
direct compensation, which includes annual salary,
short-term bonus, and the value of long-term incen-
tive grants (Carpenter and Sanders, 2004; Sanders
and Carpenter, 1998). Stock option grants were
valued using the Black-Scholes method (Sanders
and Carpenter, 1998). The results were robust
to alternative valuation methods, including the
SEC present value method (Sanders and Carpen-
ter, 1998). Performance shares, restricted stock, and
other long-term grants were valued at the market
price on the date of grant (Crystal, 1984). The CEO
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ownership and performance contingency of CEO
compensation variables were lagged by one year in
the primary analysis.
Board independence is a complex construct and
consequently we measured it using multiple indi-
cators (for reviews, see Chatterjee and Harrison,
2001; Finkelstein et al., 2009). First, we measured
the proportion of the board composed of outside
directors not affiliated with the firm (i.e., they lack
any known employment or business ties to the
firm) (Brickley et al., 1988). Second, we measured
whether the CEO and board chair positions are
separate. Boards with an independent chairperson
are better able to prevent the CEO from advanc-
ing his/her personal interests by controlling the
agenda of board meetings (Finkelstein et al., 2009).
Third, we measured the portion of outside directors
whom the CEO considered to be personal friends,
because governance scholars have suggested that
outside directors who are friends with the CEOmay
lose objectivity when assessing the CEO’s deci-
sion making or performance (for review, see Finkel-
stein et al., 2009; see also Fredrickson, Hambrick,
and Baumrin, 1988; Westphal, 1999). Our measure
of friendship ties has been used and validated in
several recent studies (McDonald, Khanna, and
Westphal, 2008; McDonald and Westphal, 2003;
Westphal, 1999). There was a high degree of
inter-rater agreement between CEOs and respond-
ing outside directors about the strength of their
personal relationship (weighted kappa= 0.88). In
the primary analyses we used CEO responses to
measure friendship ties. As a robustness check in
separate analyses we used director responses and
the hypothesized results were unchanged. Finally,
we measured outside director ownership—which
is thought to motivate directors to block policies
that would advance CEO interests at the expense
of shareholders (Finkelstein et al., 2009)—as the
percentage of total common stock held by outside
directors.
We combined the four indicators of board inde-
pendence into an index using principal components
analysis (PCA) (Jackson, 1991). PCA is primarily a
data reduction technique which is appropriate when
combining a set of causal indicators (i.e., forma-
tive rather than reflective indicators) (MacCallum
and Browne, 1993). Although causal indicators do
not necessarily need to be correlated, factor anal-
ysis showed that all four indicators loaded on the
same factor with an eigenvalue greater than one. In
separate analyses we included the portion of out-
side directors appointed during the CEO’s tenure
as another indicator of board independence (Wade,
O’Reilly, and Chandratat, 1990), and the hypothe-
sized results presented below were unchanged.
We measured the level of pressure-resistant
institutional ownership as the equity held by
public pension funds, mutual funds, endowments
and foundations, divided by the total amount
of common stock. The board independence and
pressure-resistant institutional ownership variables
were lagged by one year in the primary analysis.
Control variables
To rule out alternative explanations we controlled
for CEO attributes and firm characteristics that
could be associated with CEO organizational iden-
tification. It is possible that, when the firm is diver-
sified into different business areas that have little
in common with each other, the CEO will be less
likely to perceive the firm as a coherent, unified, and
meaningful whole with which to identify. We there-
fore controlled for unrelated diversification using
the unrelated entropy measure (Palepu, 1985). This
measure is given by:
DU =
N∑
i=1
Pi ln (1∕Pi)
where Pi is the proportion of business activity
(sales) in SIC code i, for a corporation withN differ-
ent two-digit SIC businesses. CEOs often exercise
their boundary-spanning role by sitting as outside
members on the boards of directors of other firms.
As the CEO’s attention and energy are dispersed
across a wider set of firms, the degree to which
the CEO perceives his/her home firm as a dis-
tinct in-group with which to identify relative to
the out-group represented by the other firms, may
decrease. We therefore controlled for number of
outside board appointments as a count of all the
external board appointments the CEO had outside
the firm. The unrelated diversification and num-
ber of outside board appointments variables were
lagged by one year in the primary analysis. The
results were robust to measures of these variables
that averaged each over the prior two years, or over
the prior three years.
Being the founder of the organization, or being
a member of the founder’s family, could lead to
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higher levels of CEO organizational identification
because of the increased exposure to the firm and
increased control over and knowledge about the
firm. We therefore controlled for CEO founder or
founding family member, a dichotomous variable
set at one if the CEO was the founder of the firm
or was part of the founding family, and set at
zero otherwise. The length of time that the CEO
has been with the firm could also be associated
with his/her level of organizational identification.
Theorists have argued that increased tenure with the
organization leads members to see organizational
attributes as more salient and memorable, to per-
ceive the organization’s identity as more favorable,
to view organizational membership as more salient
for self-categorization, and to consider organiza-
tional membership as more primary as opposed
to other group memberships (Dutton et al., 1994;
Mael and Ashforth, 1992; O’Reilly and Chatman,
1986). However, the positive effect of tenure on
identification might be weakened if individuals
also identify strongly with the organization shortly
after joining it. A strong sense of belonging helps
to justify the choice to join the organization. We
controlled for CEO tenure as the number of years
the individual has been the CEO at the focal firm.
Although a relationship between organizational
size and organizational identification is not typi-
cally predicted in the organizational identification
literature, as a precaution we controlled for firm
size to allow for any effect that size might have on
the degree to which the CEO sees the organization
as self-enhancing, distinctive, or an appealing place
to belong. We control for firm size as annual sales
(log) (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Yermack, 2006). For
similar reasons, we controlled for industry in all
models by including a series of dummy variables.
We created our dummy variables at the two-digit
SIC code level of the firm’s primary industry
(coefficients for these variables are not reported but
are available from the authors). We hypothesized in
this study about the effect on CEO organizational
identification of pay that is performance contingent.
To test that prediction while holding constant the
level of pay that is not performance contingent,
we control for CEO total cash compensation,
which includes the CEO’s annual salary and bonus.
To mitigate hypothetical sources of unobserved
heterogeneity not captured by our other controls,
and to rule out the alternative explanation of reverse
causality, we controlled for the one-year prior value
of the dependent variable, CEO organizational
identification (Bergh and Fairbank, 2002). To
determine whether instrumentation is required
we tested for residual autocorrelation when the
lagged dependent variable is included (Keele and
Kelly, 2006). The Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge
test was not significant (p> 0.43), and thus we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that residual
autocorrelation is absent from our model. The
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test also indicated
that heteroskedasticity is not present in the model
(Wooldridge, 2010). In separate models we estab-
lished the robustness of our results to including
different instrumental variables.1 Finally we note
that the results are robust to including or excluding
the lagged dependent variable from the models.
RESULTS
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and Table 2
shows the OLS regression results. There was no
evidence of multicollinearity affecting the results.
In each of the models all variance inflation factors
were below 10 and the average was not significantly
greater than 1 (Chatterjee, Hadi, and Price, 2000).
Model 1 in Table 2 includes the control variables,
Model 2 adds the hypothesized main effect vari-
ables, and Model 3 adds in the hypothesized inter-
actions.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 predicted that the tenor of the
firm’s press coverage and firm performance would
each be positively related to subsequent CEO orga-
nizational identification. The positive, statistically
significant coefficients for those variables shown in
Models 2 and 3 strongly support both hypotheses.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 predicted that the level of CEO
1 In one model we followed the approach described by Bond
(2002: 145), in which the value of the dependent variable in year
t - 2 is used as the instrumental variable. Although this model
reduces our sample size, the hypothesized results were essentially
unchanged. In another model we added the performance contin-
gency of CEO compensation in year t - 2 as an instrumental vari-
able. The intuition for this instrument is that the CEO’s current
organizational identification is not likely to be influenced by the
performance contingency of their pay in year t - 2 independently
of identification in year t - 1 or performance contingency in year
t - 1. Again, the hypothesized results were essentially unchanged.
Since this model is overidentified, we were able to conduct the
Sargan identification test (Bond, 2002; Murray, 2006). It was not
statistically significant (p> 0.37), and thus we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. We also note that
the first-stage F-statistic was statistically significant and exceeded
the most conservative Stock-Yogo critical value (Stock and Yogo,
2005). Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis that the instruments
are weak.
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Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations of key variablesa
Variable Mean S.D.
1. Tenor of press coverage 0.11 0.31
2. Firm performance 0.00 0.93
3. CEO ownership 0.01 0.04
4. Performance contingency of CEO compensation 0.45 0.19
5. Board independence 0.00 1.31
6. Pressure-resistant institutional ownership 0.39 0.19
7. Unrelated diversification 0.04 0.43
8. Number of outside board appointments 2.58 2.04
9. CEO founder or founding family member 0.06 0.23
10. CEO tenure 6.41 5.77
11. Sales (log) 9.79 0.60
12. CEO total cash compensation 8.33 1.15
13. CEO organizational identification 0.00 0.95
14. Prior CEO organizational identification 0.00 0.95
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Tenor of press coverage
2. Firm performance −0.13
3. CEO ownership 0.03 −0.09
4. Performance contingency of CEO compensation 0.07 0.03 0.13
5. Board independence 0.02 0.07 −0.01 −0.07
6. Pressure-resistant institutional ownership 0.02 0.04 −0.11 0.03 0.05
7. Unrelated diversification −0.06 −0.12 −0.08 −0.01 −0.07 −0.08
8. Number of outside board appointments −0.01 0.05 0.04 0.03 −0.03 −0.02 0.04
9. CEO founder or founding family member 0.02 −0.07 0.32 0.12 −0.12 −0.04 0.04 0.08
10. CEO tenure −0.03 −0.04 0.06 −0.11 −0.10 −0.02 0.03 0.07
11. Sales (log) −0.07 −0.06 −0.05 0.04 0.05 0.16 0.27 0.06
12. CEO total cash compensation −0.14 0.11 0.03 0.12 −0.12 −0.05 0.05 0.04
13. CEO organizational identification 0.21 0.19 0.14 0.17 −0.20 −0.17 −0.28 −0.26
14. Prior CEO organizational identification 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.07 −0.14 −0.13 −0.19 −0.18
15. Board independence× tenor of press coverage 0.06 −0.07 0.02 0.02 0.16 0.07 −0.09 −0.03
16. Board independence×firm performance −0.02 0.03 −0.06 −0.02 −0.10 0.04 −0.10 0.03
17. Inst’l ownership× tenor of press coverage 0.08 −0.06 −0.03 0.08 0.04 0.11 −0.09 −0.01
18. Institutional ownership×firm performance −0.09 0.03 −0.12 0.04 −0.01 0.05 −0.03 0.02
Variable 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
10. CEO tenure 0.24
11. Sales (log) −0.25 0.08
12. CEO total cash compensation 0.06 0.11 0.36
13. CEO organizational identification 0.22 0.09 −0.07 0.05
14. Prior CEO organizational identification 0.19 0.07 −0.05 0.02 0.49
15. Board independence× tenor of press coverage −0.08 −0.07 −0.01 −0.16 −0.15 −0.08
16. Board independence×firm performance −0.09 −0.05 −0.02 −0.03 −0.17 −0.09 −0.11
17. Inst’l ownership× tenor of press coverage 0.03 −0.01 0.02 −0.08 −0.14 −0.11 0.04 −0.01
18. Institutional ownership×firm performance −0.05 −0.02 0.05 0.04 −0.10 −0.05 −0.01 0.11 −0.12
a n= 772, where |R|> 0.07, p≤ 0.05.
ownership in the firm and the firm-performance
contingency of CEO compensation would each be
positively related to subsequent CEO identifica-
tion. The positive, statistically significant coeffi-
cients for those variables shown in Models 2 and
3 strongly support both hypotheses. Hypotheses 5
and 6 predicted that the levels of board indepen-
dence and institutional ownership in the firm would
each be negatively related to subsequent CEO orga-
nizational identification. The negative, statistically
significant coefficients for those variables shown in
Models 2 and 3 strongly support both hypotheses.
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Table 2. Regression models of CEO organization identificationa
Predicted Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Tenor of press coverage H1 (+) 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
Firm performance H2 (+) 0.100** 0.103**
(0.033) (0.033)
CEO ownership H3 (+) 2.041** 2.046**
(0.747) (0.750)
Performance contingency of CEO compensation H4 (+) 0.475** 0.472**
(0.164) (0.165)
Board independence H5 (−) −0.069** −0.067**
(0.022) (0.022)
Pressure-resistant institutional ownership H6 (−) −0.378* −0.364*
(0.153) (0.154)
Board independence× tenor of press coverage H7a (−) −0.003***
(0.001)
Board independence×firm performance H7b (−) −0.015**
(0.005)
Institutional ownership× tenor of press coverage H7c (−) −0.061**
(0.020)
Institutional ownership×firm performance H7d (−) −0.304†
(0.163)
Unrelated diversification −0.179*** −0.182*** −0.186***
(0.052) (0.053) (0.056)
Number of outside board appointments −0.046*** −0.043*** −0.042**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
CEO founder or founding family member 0.312** 0.310** 0.314**
(0.117) (0.118) (0.118)
CEO tenure 0.010* 0.011* 0.011*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Sales (log) −0.084† −0.085† −0.086†
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Industry dummies Included Included Included
CEO total cash compensation 0.046† 0.046† 0.046†
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Prior CEO organizational identification 0.382*** 0.350*** 0.324***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Constant 0.881 0.843 0.687
(0.540) (0.547) (0.547)
F 8.89*** 14.55*** 21.23***
R2 0.26 0.44 0.63
a n= 772. Two-tailed t-tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.
†p≤ 0.10; *p≤ 0.05; **p≤ 0.01; ***p≤ 0.001
The results of our hypotheses tests show effects
that are fairly strong in magnitude. For example,
an increase in board independence of one stan-
dard deviation from the mean level is associated
with a reduction in CEO organizational identifica-
tion of more than two points on an eight-point scale
(e.g., from “very large overlap between self-image
and the organization’s” to a level that is between a
“small overlap” and a “moderate overlap”). Each
of the other independent variables has effects of
comparable magnitude. In each case a standard
deviation increase in the independent variable is
associated with a difference in CEO organizational
identification of at least two points on an eight-item
scale. Similarly, for the five-point scale “to what
degree does your self-image overlap with the orga-
nization,” for each of the independent variables an
increase in the variable of one standard deviation is
associated with a difference of more than one point.
(e.g., from “a substantial degree” of overlap to “a
modest degree” of overlap).
Hypotheses 7a–d each predicted an interac-
tive effect on CEO organizational identification
between structural limitations on the CEO’s control
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(board independence or institutional ownership)
and favorable firm outcomes (positive press or firm
performance). Model 3 shows negative, statistically
significant coefficients for the interactions of board
independence and tenor of firm press coverage,
board independence and firm performance, and
institutional ownership and tenor of firm press
coverage, indicating strong support for Hypotheses
7a–c. Model 3 shows a negative, marginally sig-
nificant (p= 0.06) coefficient for the interaction of
institutional ownership and firm performance, sug-
gesting tentative support for Hypothesis 7d. When
those interactions are plotted (graphs are available
in Figure S1), the graphs further confirm that as
tenor of press coverage becomes more favorable,
high board independence (and high institutional
ownership) constrain the effect of CEO organi-
zational identification more than does low board
independence (and low institutional ownership).
Likewise, as firm performance becomesmore favor-
able, high board independence (and high institu-
tional ownership) constrain the effect of CEO orga-
nizational identification more than does low board
independence (and low institutional ownership). As
a robustness check, we conducted separate models
(not shown) that regress CEO organizational iden-
tification at time t on changes in the independent
variables from time t - 2 to time t - 1 and the results
are very similar to those reported in Table 2 (none
of the hypothesized results become nonsignificant).
DISCUSSION
The goal of this paper was to develop additional
insight into organizational factors that may influ-
ence the psychological orientation of the CEO
toward the firm and to provide a more complete
understanding of what may lead CEOs to identify
with their firms. To do so, we drew on Vignoles
et al. (2006) to outline motives that people might
have for organizational identification. We then con-
sidered how variables that prior research has shown
to characterize the CEO position or to be especially
associated with the actions of the CEOmight be rel-
evant to those motives. The theory and hypotheses
we developed pertained to the high degree to which
the image and performance of the firm are attributed
to the CEO, the potentially high degree to which the
CEO has vested financial interest in the firm, and the
structural controls that firms employ to attempt to
rein in CEO self-serving behavior. We further theo-
rized that the CEO’s felt control and the favorability
of firm attributes would have an interactive effect
on CEO organizational identification. Our empiri-
cal findings strongly supported the main effect and
most of the interactive effect antecedents of CEO
organizational identification that we hypothesized.
By examining and predicting the organizational
identification of CEOs, this study makes a num-
ber of valuable contributions to theory and research.
First, we contribute to the upper echelons perspec-
tive, in particular the growing literature on the psy-
chology of corporate leaders (e.g., Boivie et al.,
2011; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; Gupta and
Govindarajan, 1984; Hayward andHambrick, 1997;
Hayward et al., 2004; Miller and Droge, 1986;
Miller et al., 1982; Nadkarni and Herrmann, 2010;
Wally and Baum, 1994). Most of that literature
investigates stable executive traits or dispositions as
antecedents of firm outcomes. In our study we turn
that equation around by investigating organizational
factors as predictors of a relatively changeable psy-
chological state: CEO organizational identification.
We provide evidence that different facets of the
experience of being a CEO influence the CEO’s psy-
chological relationship with the firm.
Second, this study contributes to the nascent lit-
erature on organizational identification at the top
of the firm (Boivie et al., 2011; Davis et al., 1997;
Johnson et al., 2006; Peterson et al., 2012). By con-
sidering aspects of the CEO position that make it
qualitatively different from other positions in the
organization, and by considering those aspects in
light of theory from the identification literature,
we show how such firm characteristics as finan-
cial performance and positive press coverage can
influence the CEO’s level of organizational iden-
tification. Prior theory and empirical findings have
considered the positive outcomes for organizations
of CEO organizational identification (Boivie et al.,
2011; Davis et al., 1997). The central argument in
those studies is that a CEO with strong organi-
zational identification will tend to see little or no
distinction between the organization’s interests and
his/her own. Here, we provide a complement to that
prior research by investigating characteristics of the
organization and CEO position that may predict the
potentially beneficial state of CEO organizational
identification.
Third, by examining motives leading to organi-
zational identification in the context of the CEO
position, this study makes a contribution to the
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governance literature by extending prior research
that has examined the effects of CEO organiza-
tional identification on important firm outcomes.
In particular, while Boivie et al. (2011) found that
high organizational identification made governance
controls effectively redundant, in this study we
show how governance controls can themselves
reduce or enhance the degree to which the CEO
identifies with the firm. We draw on the motives
that lead to identification to show how aspects of
the CEO’s organizational life that are widely con-
sidered to be governance mechanisms, including
the degree of the CEO’s financial investment in
the firm, the degree to which the CEO’s financial
rewards are tied to firm performance, the degree to
which the firm is owned by institutional investors,
and the degree to which the board is independent of
management, have a relationship to organizational
identification. When these studies are considered
together, they suggest that extrinsic controls empha-
sized in the prior literature have unanticipated side
effects on agency costs, through reducing CEO
organizational identification, that diminish their
overall value to corporate governance. For example,
institutional ownership is a commonly theorized
source of control on CEO self-serving behavior
(Brickley et al., 1988; Bushee, 1998; David et al.,
1998, 2010; Hartzell and Starks, 2003). Yet if,
as we show here, institutional ownership has a
negative influence on CEO organizational identifi-
cation, then its ultimate controlling effect on CEO
self-serving behavior may be weakened.
One of the major implications of this study, then,
is that one category of traditional agency problem
controls, namely those that entail vested interest and
incentive alignment, may have the indirect effect of
enhancing organizational identification, and there-
fore of furthering the goals of those agency problem
controls—to promote and encourage the CEO’s
stewardship orientation. At the same time, the other
dominant category of traditional agency problem
controls, those that entail structural limitations on
the CEO’s ability to exercise autonomous control,
may have the side effect of diminishing organi-
zational identification, and therefore paradoxically
may work at cross purposes with the goals of those
agency problem controls. Moreover, because those
autonomy reducing controls (especially board inde-
pendence) appear to diminish the otherwise positive
effect of favorable firm attributes (including positive
press and firm performance) on CEO organizational
identification, they may further work at cross pur-
poses with the goals of those controls.
Thus, our results contribute to the stream
of research that has focused on the potential
substitutability and/or complementarity of mon-
itoring and incentive systems to control agency
problems (e.g., Rediker and Seth, 1995; Tosi,
Katz, and Gomez-Mejia, 1997; Ward, Brown, and
Rodriguez, 2009; Zajac and Westphal, 1994). That
stream of research has explored how, given the right
conditions, certain governance control mechanisms
may serve as functional replacements for other
governance control mechanisms, or sometimes
may serve as complements for other governance
control mechanisms, meaning that “the presence
or addition of one mechanism strengthens the
other and leads to more effective governance in
addressing agency problems” (Ward et al., 2009:
648). The findings from the current study suggest
one way in which, due to their conflicting influence
on CEO organizational identification, the effects
of monitoring and incentive systems on agency
problems in the firm may ultimately have differ-
ential, indeed opposing, effects on an important
dimension of the CEO’s psychological orientation
toward the firm.
A valuable subject for future research is a more
in-depth exploration of the contingencies (e.g., indi-
vidual CEO differences, organizational contextual
differences) that might enhance or hamper the
degree to which the antecedents we identified in this
study do indeed lead to organizational identifica-
tion. One can imagine how variables that we did
not collect or theorize about in this study—e.g.,
the CEO’s psychological traits, the CEO’s per-
sonal wealth outside of his/her vested financial
interest in the focal organization, the organiza-
tion’s culture—might represent factors that affect
the mechanisms of identification we argue in this
study. For example, high personal wealth of the
CEO outside of the organization may render even
high degrees of vested financial interest in the focal
firm less salient for the CEO, and therefore less
predictive of organizational identification. Contin-
gencies such as these represent boundary condi-
tions that may need to be isolated as we continue
to improve our understanding of what leads to orga-
nizational identification among members in general
and CEOs in particular.
Our findings that CEO organizational identi-
fication may be influenced by common features
of the organization and the CEO position, and by
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commonly employed mechanisms for controlling
the agency problem in organizations, have practical
implications for the governance of organizations. If
indeed there is an indirect link between those orga-
nizational identification antecedents and important
firm outcomes—such as firm performance—which
may stem from the stewardship orientation of the
CEO, it would be valuable for boards of directors
to consider which of the antecedents of CEO
organizational identification might be in their con-
trol. The control variables in our models suggest
that CEO organizational identification may be
enhanced if boards retain the founder as the CEO,
or leave the CEO in his/her position for a long
time. Yet, prior research suggests that founder
status, especially beyond the early years of the
organization’s life, and very long executive tenure,
are not unambiguously positive contributors to
organizational performance (e.g., Jayaraman et al.,
2000; Miller and Shamsie, 2001).
Some of our predictors are out of the board’s
control, at least in the short term. In particular,
although firms attempt to manage the press and
its coverage of the firm (Graffin, Carpenter, and
Boivie, 2011; Westphal and Deephouse, 2011),
boards cannot readily manufacture the positive
press and positive firm performance that our
results suggest may enhance CEO organizational
identification. However, other predictors in our
model are under the board’s control. As boards
consider governance mechanisms intended to
enhance the CEO’s stewardship orientation toward
the organization, either by restricting his/her ability
to exercise autonomous control or by aligning
his/her incentives with the organization’s goals, our
results may be informative. In particular, incentive
alignment mechanisms—including those that
increase CEO ownership in the firm, and those
that increase the degree to which the CEO’s pay is
firm-performance contingent—may have benefi-
cial effects on CEO organizational identification.
By contrast, monitoring mechanisms—including
those that increase institutional ownership of the
firm, and those that increase board independence
from management—may decrease CEO organi-
zational identification. This latter implication may
be especially important to the board working to
ensure that the very exercise of governance control
mechanisms does not undermine the effectiveness
of those mechanisms.
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